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In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
Have We not opened your breast for you?
And We removed from you your burden,
Which weighed down your back?
And We exalted for you your reputation?
So verily, with the hardship, there is relief,
Verily, with the hardship, there is relief
So when you have finished, then stand up for Allah's worship
And to Allah turn your invocations.
- Surah 94;596 Al-Inshirah (The Opening Up)
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Introduction
China has a long and intricate history that goes all the way from being leaders in the
globalization and silver/gold production to heavy taxation and colonization by other western
powers. All of this change, like that America, lead toward a revolutionary war within China. This
was would not only determine the fate of China till modern times but how other international
powers would perceive China. The result of this war is something completely unknown to that of
the US, instead of a capitalist society and free democracy being formed, we see a communist
system arise, something only a few countries had experimented with. Even to this day, China is
one of five communist countries still remaining in the world. So it is safe to say that China,
coming from a system heavily oppressed by western capitalist powers, and transforming into a
self sustaining nation is astounding. The question is at what cost was this possible? History is
remembered by the winners, even in U.S. history we talk about how during political turmoil they
are tough decisions to be made that may not always be popular with the citizens of the country.
A good example of this would be Richard Nixon, to this date he is known to have one of the
more successful elections of our time. But his stances on certain issues such as race would today
be hateful and uncommon. In addition to this he was also the only president in US history to
resign from office due to an ongoing investigation later, known as Watergate. The investigation
looked into unethical activities of acquiring information via coercion, wiretapping and other
methods. And this wasn't just a private issue but highly publicized and well known amongst the
people to the point where it became a social dispute that resulted in his resignation. In times of
unrest and blatant negligence for humane and ethical regulations are still upheld by not only the
government but also the people who make up the country.
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But how can we relate this too the China? During this change in system of government
we see China take on a huge burden of how to rebuild a country. During this time there was close
to zero economic production, political unease and social chaos. Mao Zedong who was not only
one of the founders of the CCP and bringing China into this new era had a huge task ahead of
him if he want to essentially rebuild a country. Mao even before the outcome of the war was
known as the leader of the CCP and Chinese Communism as a whole. And he took this name and
job reluctantly; you could tell during his speeches and texts that he fully believed that the
Communism in China was the way to bring it back to their rightful spot as world leaders. This
power was also embodied by the millions of Chinese that followed him and together they had
driven invaders and the opposition out of the country giving them the space to create such a
system. This also gave a name for Mao globally, foreign and western powers became weary after
the revolution for they feared that this communist fervor was a threat to their own capitalistic
system. Everything about Mao Zedong during this time gave him a name that would not only be
important for years to come but will be remember forever in history and being one of the
founders of communism in the world. But at the same time all of this happening the beginnings
of one of the worst man made atrocities in human history would occur over a period of 10 years.
It is recorded that anywhere from 25 to 30 million people had died of starvation over this time
period. Some of the highest death estimates being closer to 45 million (Holmes 21). To put this
number in perspective Adolf Hitler during his reign had a death toll of 17 million during the
period of occupation in Europe by the Nazi’s from th periods of 1939 to 1945. (Niewyk 35)
Another example of mass loss of human life would be World War II where the highest estimates
of casualties would be around 85 million affected worldwide (Fink 40).

Ali 3

The decisions made that resulted in the deaths of these 30 million people weren’t split
second decisions but a collective of choices made over a period of what I have consolidated to 10
years. It was during these 10 years that one after another, Mao Zedong made poor decisions that
drastically hindered China politically, socially and economically. After a few poor decisions you
would believe that they’re would be some sort of change within the communist government, But
there were steps that Mao had personally taken during this 10 year period that not only solidified
his position as not only a permanent leader of the communist party but also a lingering power
even after he stepped down. Even today, Mao is still the face and known face when anyone talks
about the foundation and liberation of China.
So this raises the question, of why is Mao; despite all of the given facts we have now
about this era of the rise of communism, still considered a hero amongst the people of China in
being the force that had brought them back to not only modernity but economic, political and
social prosperity? Also how did one person accumulate so much power within what is supposed
to be a powerless system. Below I will explain in detail about how this rise to power actually
occurred and also bring raise the question of the motivation behind Mao and could he still be
considered this leader to China despite the terror and horror caused under his rule of the Founder
of modern China.
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Chapter I: Government Breakdown, Economic Policy and Social Campaigns
Before we understand the power that Mao had within the CCP we must first breakdown
the governmental system during this time--how decisions and policies were made and what type
of system this would prevail under a communist-ruled country. The system in place had to be
completely re-done during the radical change from a Kuomintang state/capitalist political system
to a communist state. The new government of the CCP would be a communal system of
government that would not only cater to the forward development of China but also equalize
power and resources. The first and most important group within the CCP during its founding was
the Politburo’s Standing Committee. This first generation of leaders during the founding of the
people's republic of China consisted of Mao Zedong--Chairman of the Party Central
Committee-- and the Four Vice Chairman of the Party Central Committee: Zhou Enlai, Zhu De,
Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun. Another very important member during this time and even in the later
years of Mao’s rule was Peng Dehuai, who was Communist Party's Organization Department
head and later General Secretary of the Central Committee.
The breakdown of how this system was enacted and who was doing what is best
described as a triangle, where a small number (top of the triangle) controlled and made executive
decisions and laws. For the sake of understanding the different conferences and plenums we need
to distinguish the different roles and players at the top. Within the top chinese leadership known
as the Politburo they can be anywhere from 20 to 30 elected leaders by the lower officials. The
politburo itself includes multiple positions, these include; the Preeminent leader who at this time
would be Mao Zedong. Mao was the first assumed Chairman of the Communist Party of China
and Chairman of the People's Republic of China marking the first generation of Chinese
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communist leadership. Later Mao would also hold told title of Chairman of the Central Military
Commission which essentially gave him control over all branches of the government making him
leader of all branches of the government. It wasn't until the passing of Mao and the redistribution
of power that molded a new ranking within the Politburo. The second most important figures
within the Politburo are known as party Elders that assisted in and influenced decisions that are
made at any given time. Despite some of these people holding lesser positions because of the
history and knowledge of political structure these Elders were sometimes the only people that
could respectively challenge decisions being made by the current Preeminent leader. Formed and
most influential during the post-Mao rule, party Elders wasn't much of a position until the 1980s.
Underneath both the leader and later, party Elders were a group of prominent officials, similar to
the description of prime ministers or chiefs of staff, this group's main focus is to dispute and
solve and influence major bureaucratic disputes. This role and its players in relation to the
preeminent leader; Mao is the main focus of how the events leading to the Lushan Conference
ended with Mao turning into the proclaimed leader of the CCP. The key leaders in this group are
Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi. Despite each of these people
holding a different role their decisions and input can greatly sway the tides of how certain
legislation is passed within the party. Now that we have established a very loose background of
how the hierarchy works in the upper most important level of the CCP we can talk about
specifically how what what policies were passed during the time of the Mao rule. From the
timespan of 1949 to 1975 they were exactly 298 recorded meetings pertaining to everything that
is known as “Housekeeping” meetings. These meetings were held and took place for the
following reasons:
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1. Policy X was adopted pragmatically to solve new policy problems pressing
upon the leaders; 2. Policy X was promulgated in order to keep alive the
ideological vision of its proponents; 3. Policy X was adopted as a tactical ploy
of one or several temporarily allied leaders to rebuff a challenge from rivals;
or 4. Policy X was adopted by a dominant and enduring faction for the
rewards it bestows upon its network of loyalists.

1

Lieberthal et.al
Now that we can categorize and identify the reasons these meetings/conferences took place, we
can now analyze them and place each one of these meetings into two groupings. Reasons 1 and 2
from the quote above were to maintain and move forward the communist ideals and morals some
which were set forth by Mao Zedong’s speeches during the period of the Hundred Flowers
Campaign. During this time as stated in the previous chapter these speeches were the
groundwork and influence of how certain policies were enacted in the party. Despite everyone
not fully knowing about each and every policy that as put into place and how to enforce them,
the power of Mao’s speeches and publishing during this time became law. For example, the
speech “On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” was given to 1900
officials at a supreme State Conference in February of 1957 (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 119).
The messaged in this speech was to outline and summarize specific ideals and systems in which
the country of China would be running. Specifically this meeting spoke a lot about counter

 ieberthal, Kenneth, et al. “Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes.” Policy Making
L
in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 3–31.
1
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revolutionaries and how to deal/combat backlash from the radical switch from a capitalist society
to that of communism. In the speech Mao gave he stated:
Among students and intellectuals there has recently been a falling off in
ideological and political work, and some unhealthy tendencies have appeared.
Some people seem to think that there is no longer any need to concern themselves
with politics or with the future of the motherland and the ideals of mankind. It
seems as if Marxism, once all the rage, is currently not so much in fashion. To
counter these tendencies, we must strengthen our ideological and political work.
Both students and intellectuals should study hard. In addition to the study of their
specialized subjects, they must make progress ideologically and politically, which
means they should study Marxism, current events and politics.
Tse-Tung 406
In this lengthy section from the speech, we again see like in other texts during this time, despite
the progress being made there was always a sort of impending thought that was seen before in
previous Mao speeches.There was always the constant threat of anti-communists and backlash
from both within the party and with people within society. But certain laws and policies would of
never passed if it wasn't for the gridiron support Mao and others had within their branches of
government.
Referring back to the previous quote, we see in both reasons 3 and 4 that leaders can call
a meeting to forward and reassert their positions of power. Policies and even meetings during
this time had taken place to solidify and confirm positions with allies in the upper ranks of the
CCP. In addition to the Lushan Conference being an obvious use of this power and strategy;
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another example of this would be the near following years after this conference when there was a
shift in people who Mao could trust. December 30th 1964 there was a Supreme State Conference
where Liu Shaoqi and other prominent leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and one hundred and
seventy others came together to talk about both international and nation issues in the country at
the time. It was also at this conference where Liu Shaoqi used the time to talk about proposed
new members to join the ranks, preparing for larger conferences taking place later that month.
Beyond this, based on the notes we have recorded from this meeting, we know that Liu Shaoqi
used this time as well to advocate and explain his views on an early stage of what is known as
2

the “Later Ten Points.” (Liberthal and Oksenberg 220) This movement would be the
groundwork for a later Socialist Education Movement, the problem with all of this was that at the
same time Liu Shaoqi had held this conference, Mao himself was refining a social movement
3

draft known as “Twenty-three points.” (Liberthal and Oksenburg 221) This is just one of many
examples based on the conference summaries where we see Liu Shaoqi have opposing points and
calling out for a separate route of action because the current way things were was not working:
They are not rightists, but they are on the verge of becoming rightists. They are
still thirty kilometres away from the rightists. The rightists very much welcomed
the trend of what they had to say and it would be surprising if they didn’t. These
comrades’ brinkmanship is rather dangerous. If you don’t believe me, wait and
see what happens. I am saying these things before a big audience. Some of what I

Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in
China 1949-1975.” International Journal of Politics, vol. 5, no. 2/3, 1975, pp. 220-223. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/27868827.
3
Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in
China 1949-1975.” International Journal of Politics, vol. 5, no. 2/3, 1975, pp. 220-223. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/27868827.
2
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say may hurt people. But if I remained silent now, this would not be in these
comrades’ interest.
Tse-Tung
This was one of the most famed phrases that had come out of the Lushan Conference itself and
one of the reasons why Mao had assumed so much power. It was at this time that elected leaders
who had more moderate ideals such as Liu Shaoqi and the author of the of the original letter
Peng Dehuai were immediately vilified by Mao. Despite the criticism being accurate in that the
failures of the Great Leap Forward being disastrous, it was interpreted by Mao as being a person
attack on himself as a leader. This also goes against the original structure of how the Politburo
Standing Committee and Politburo as a whole. We see this second type of policy making
happening more and more after the pivotal Lushan Conference. As the fate of Liu Shaoqi, on the
official announcement of the Cultural Revolution in August of 1966; we see a demotion as his
title as Vice chairman of the CCP, and moved from Second to eighth place Within the Politburo.

4

(Liberthal and Oksenberg 261)
Now that we have the basics of the Chinese communist government works and a general
breakdown on how legislation gets passed we can talk about actual economic and social policies
that were passed during this time. On an international level, China also had to make and meet
certain goals when it came to exports and production if they wanted to accomplish such goals set
forth by the Great Leap Forward. Mao, the now current leader of the CCP, realized that to do so
money or aid in some form was needed; the wars essentially halted all forms of production and

Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. A Research Guide to Central Party and Government
Meetings in China 1949-1975.” International Journal of Politics, vol. 5, no. 2/3, 1975, pp. 260-263.
JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27868827.
4
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income for China. This is when the first of many negotiations happened between both the Soviet
Union and China. Mao who derived a lot of his ideals for Maoism from Marx and Lenin realized
that creating economic and militaristic trade deals between the two would help them both thrive.
This is when in December of 1949, Mao traveled to China and worked out the treaty known as
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, (Silbergard and Young)
an agreement that would last all the way until their fallout in the 1960s. The specifics of this
relation was that the Soviet Union would receive a variety of agricultural products and access to
parts of China in exchange for 300 Million Yuan and other supplementary necessities such as
experts and machines to help them rebuild. The immediate intentions and power this had was
amazing. It helped kick start a multitude of projects that China had planned such as the backyard
furnaces and mass agricultural collectivization.
With this communist new ally and economic support, this gave way to the introduction of
the first Five-year plan. Starting in 1953 and ending in 1957, Mao believed that the two most
important forms of economic growth were Grain and Steel. This was known as the launch of
Industrial production within China. As some numbers state during the time period of 1958 they
5

were 21 million Chinese workers registered in non-agricultural positions (Duan et. al. 20) in
charge of producing light industry. Steel was very essential both for catching up from a military
standpoint but also to make amends for the amount of metal lost during the previous wars and
their current battle with Taiwan. This was also an incentive of motivating both people and the
communes that they were directly affecting and helping efforts toward the are and the country.
But in the long run such emphasis on industrial production would end up hurting not only the

5

Duan, C., Gao, S., & Zhu, Y. (n.d.). The Phenomenon of Internal Migration in China. In Chinese

Migration and Families-at-Risk (pp. 14-36). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
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economy but the people as well. Because of such intense focus on industry the outcome of the
mass agricultural collectivization failed. Throughout the remainder of this first Five-year plan we
see many mitigations being made and to focus on light industry to restart the country. To me, this
is the first decision made by Mao that ultimately lead to the starvation and deaths of 30 million
people. Following the first Five-year economic plan; The Great Leap Forward which started in
1958 and prior campaigns such as the backyard furnace campaign where just contributing plans
that were made to salvage prior decisions that ended up hurting China as a whole. As an attempt
to help change the doomed path China was taking in 1957 Mao gave a speech calling all
intellectuals and others who could help steer China in the right direction to speak up. This speech
and movement in 1957 was marked as the Hundred Flower Movement. This is an important
event when it comes to how or when there was opportunity for change within the CCP. During
the height of the preparations and execution of the Great Leap Forward Mao signified the exact
date on the launch by giving a speech. Known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957 Mao
talks about the process a country has to go and get through and outlining rules of the Great Leap
Forward. One of the most important and memorable lines from this is “Let a hundred flower
blossom let a hundred schools of thought contend" and "Long-term coexistence and mutual
6

supervision” (Hudson et. al. 38) the launch of this idea as to get and start to open up the ideas of
communism and that exactly needs to be done to the audience of intellectuals during this time.
This speech and movement gave different people the platform to talk and directly contribute their
ideas about how the government should be run. In light of everything else that was going on and
what had been done previously, this was a huge change of perspective for Mao when it came

6

Hudson, Geoffrey Francis, et al. “The Hundred Flowers.” The Hundred Flowers, Stevens and Sons,

1960.
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toward being open about opinions and decisions he had made. But before he officially accepted
any sort of ideas he made clear within this speech a preface about the difference between that of
people who help and those who want to hurt the revolution and communism itself:
Since they are different in nature, the contradictions between ourselves and the
enemy and the contradictions among the people must be resolved by different
methods. To put it briefly, the former entail drawing a clear distinction between
ourselves and the enemy, and the latter entail drawing a clear distinction between
right and wrong. It is of course true that the distinction between ourselves and the
enemy is also one of right and wrong.
Tse-Tung
These distinctions that Mao talked about in his Hundred Flowers speech are things that
appear to be drastically radical in comparison to the motive behind this. By this time Mao knew
that some ideas and campaigns he made during this time were unpopular. But the gap between
what is said in the speech and what happened in reality show two different pictures. Within the
speech there are two sections that really define how and what the process was of letting
intellectuals speak their mind. These to sections are titled “The Question of Eliminating
Counter-Revolutionaries” and “The Question of Intellectuals” separately these to topics seem to
be of two different topics but when closely analysed you can see the amount of overlap these two
sections have.
The first section “The Question of Eliminating Counter-Revolutionaries” talks heavily
about refining and getting rid of old system supporters from when the KMT was in power.
Throughout this section he talks about how bad and backwards counter revolutionaries are to the
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new communist system. Mao even goes as far as to associate them with western imperialists
(Tse-Tsung), and how their main goal was not to only undermine communism but ruin the
communist fervor as a whole. Another important point to make is that he talks about these
counter revolutionaries as being hidden:
The fact is, there still are counter-revolutionaries (of course, that is not to say
you'll find them everywhere and in every organization), and we must continue to
fight them. It must be understood that the hidden counter-revolutionaries still at
large will not take things lying down, but will certainly seize even opportunity to
make trouble.
Tse-Tsung
This means even though they might not be open to critiquing the radical Socialist system, they
still too themselves aren't fully convinced of the process. Based on this inference you can make
the distinction that this is specifically pointed toward intellectuals that were still remaining in
China after the communist rise. Majority if not all businessmen/landlords/KMT and majority of
other people who had thought the same were criticized in previous campaigns. Leaving only one
threat left to the communist system, quiet intellectuals that were not convinced.
The following section within the Hundred Flowers speech is “The Question of
Intellectuals.” In this section of the speech he talks about a similar type of person that is still
wary about the socialist system being implemented during this time. But the difference between
this section and “The Question of Eliminating Counter-Revolutionaries” is the tone about how
China as a whole can benefit from intellectuals and their importance in growing the economy:
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China needs the services of as many intellectuals as possible for the colossal task
of building socialism. We should trust those who are really willing to serve the
cause of socialism and should radically improve our relations with them and help
them solve the problems requiring solution, so that they can give full play to their
talents. Many of our comrades are not good at uniting with intellectuals. They are
stiff in their attitude towards them, lack respect for their work and interfere in
certain scientific and cultural matters where interference is unwarranted. We must
do away with all such shortcomings.
Tse-Tsung
Mao continues as stated in the quote above how they help educate and teach others who have no
clue what they are doing. Even people above them powerwise (officials and comrades) need to
release their biases held from the old system and accept that everyone is needed to move the
communism forward. This also gives intellectuals an opportunity to become part of the
communist movement. Education and making sure that everyone understands the correct way to
either run or control a job within the government seems to take top priority over your past
association as a intellectual with the old system. Another important idea from this chapter is the
future he has for intellectuals. That the necessity on teaching the younger generation about the
communist ideas is very crucial. He states this in this speech but also in other that the children
and the younger generations are the future of maintaining this communist passion.
There is a very thin line that separates the differences between an intellectual and a
counter revolutionary, and this changes as we see as he continuously redefines the definition.
The difference between the two is an intellectual is someone wholeheartedly agrees with the
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communist ideals and systems versus a counter revolutionary who is in disagreement with one
part or the whole system. Another difference is that this is not just an opinion on a issue but life
or death decision people made when coming forward to talk about these issues:
After liberation, we rooted out a number of counter-revolutionaries. Some were
sentenced to death for major crimes. This was absolutely necessary, it was the
demand of the masses, and it was done to free them from long years of oppression
by the counter-revolutionaries and all kinds of local tyrants, in other words, to
liberate the productive forces.
Tse-Tsung
Death, or the thought of loss of life because of an idea you didn’t agree with or the realization
that something about the programs was wrong could result in the end of your life. Statements
like this really defined and silenced people who were questioning decisions and choices Mao had
made. The safest option was to quietly abide by rules and decisions despite what you believed.
For you were not only being judged by Mao and the rules but by the people who could assume
and get you in trouble for doing so. The next major time a situation such as counter
revolutionaries and questioning decisions being made by Mao would be that of the Lushan
Conference. In August of 1959 The Lushan Conference was held in order to talk about the
failures and shortcomings of the Great Leap Forward and prospectively the previous campaigns
and Five-year plans it as also during this conference we see a similar tone and language used by
Mao himself talking about how to suppress people saying or trying to dethrone his decision made
during the Great Leap Forward.
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Chapter II: The Great Leap Forward
The Great Leap Forward took place from 1958 and officially ended in 1962. It was
known was one of the most prominent things the newly founded Communist People's Republic
of China had done over the victory against both the KMT and Japanese during the revolution. At
the beginning of the communist rule in China, They had adapted a Soviet plan to kick start the
country economic and political process.; these 5 Year Plans and other campaigns purpose was to
recover China’s losses from the previous wars against both the KMT which ended in 1949 and
7

Japanese occupation in 1945 (Hsuing and Levine 40).With the Country in shambles; economic,
political and social reform needed to take place in order to fit the new ideology of Communism,
the intellectual ideology that made such change possible.
Now that we have a general history of the 10 years from the declaration of the PRC in
1949 to the pivotal conference in 1959 we of can talk about the specific programs and the
downfalls of each one of them. The first and most radical change is the new agricultural
difference from the old system. Before, the system in place was private ownership, meaning
farmers would sell to private business for a personal profit. So the only people that were
profiting from this system would be private buyers and the farmers that were selling to them. The
main change from this system to that of Mao’s new policy was that the ruling party would
control and on all of the exports and production in China. This was a radical way of getting to rid
the Chinese people of owning private property, this being a part of an agenda of moving from a

7

Hsiung, James C, and Steven I. Levine. China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945.

Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Print.
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capitalist system to a communist or Maoist model. Certain messages like this were also
reinforced by aggressive tactics to make sure and suppress any sorts of private property/assets:
We must oppose the tendency towards selfish departmentalism by which the
interests of one's own unit are looked after to the exclusion of those of others.
Whoever is indifferent to the difficulties of others, refuses to transfer cadres to
other units on request, or releases only the inferior ones, "using the neighbor's
field as an outlet for his overflow", and does not give the slightest consideration to
other departments, localities or people - such a person is a selfish departmentalize
who has entirely lost the spirit of communism. Lack of consideration for the
whole and complete indifference to other departments, localities and people are
characteristics of a selfish departmentalist. We must intensify our efforts to
educate such persons and to make them understand that selfish departmentalism is
a sectarian tendency that will become very dangerous, if allowed to develop.
Tse-Tsung
This change in system moving from selfish departmentalism to a communal mindset was not
only economically positive but also benefited the feeling and teaching of what a communist
society should look like. The Chinese agricultural system/experimentation that was proposed
based on Mao’s vision seems almost impossible at first. No other communist country during this
time had a safe strategy of how to attempt to attain such grain goals. In addition to this producing
large yields of grain was a task that even overseers and administrations with in the CCP have
never done before. Instead of looking and listening to specialist and analyst whose job it was to
oversee the best way to tackle mass agricultural reform, he decided to listen to a Soviet promoted
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agronomist Trofim Lysenko. Lysenko was considered a radical in his belief in mass agricultural
production. His thought was that it was not only was not only possible to produce such a massive
grain yield but too have a surplus after all exports and distributions were made. Lysenko’s
knowledge behind this was that in order to do this is more of a matter of how you plant the seeds
rather than how to tend them. He believed that by planting seed; and disregarding types of seed,
if planted close together would benefit the production of how much grain each of the plots would
yield. In addition to this, deep irrigational tilling would also be employed in order to make sure
that the roots were long enough and could produce denser yields.This theory and his ideals were
known even in the Soviet Union were considered factless, because of the numerous amounts
evidence that countered and nullified his findings:
But some of our comrades, tottering along like a woman with bound feet, are
complaining all the time, "You're going too fast, much too fast." Too much
carping, unwarranted complaints, boundless anxiety and countless taboos -- all
this they take as the right policy to guide the socialist mass movement in the rural
areas.
Tse-Tsung
Mao himself defended not only the reason he had followed Lysenko's ideas but at the same time
his decision to ignore other specialist warnings.For the top concern for Mao during this time was
speed and efficiency due to the demands China had to meet in terms of grain production. So
despite the warnings Mao had commissioned and ordered millions of people to do such as
Lysenko said. This would lead toward causing irreparable damage to both the environment and
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crops due to weather and human error made later on. All over the countryside workers deep
irrigated and densely planted crops everywhere.

The reasoning behind such immediate change was because of Maoist ideology about how a
communist system should be run. The amount of grain that needed to be produced had to be met
because there was no other option or reversal of what was already done. Now currently bound to
a contract of exports via Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance
(Silbergard and Young). China itself needed to find radical ways such as Lysenko to produce
such a yield of grain:
These comrades fail to understand that socialist industrialization cannot be carried
out in isolation from the co-operative transformation of agriculture. In the first
place, as everyone knows, China's current level of production of commodity grain
and raw materials for industry is low, whereas the state's need for them is growing
year by year, and this presents a sharp contradiction. If we cannot basically solve
the problem of agricultural co-operation within roughly three five-year plans, that
is to say, if our agriculture cannot make a leap from small-scale farming with
animal-drawn farm implements to large-scale mechanized farming, along with
extensive state-organized land reclamation by settlers using machinery (the plan
being to bring 400 to 500 million mou of waste land under cultivation in the
course of three five-year plans), then we shall fail to resolve the contradiction
between the ever-increasing need for commodity grain and industrial raw
materials and the present generally low output of staple crops, and we shall run
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into formidable difficulties in our socialist industrialization and be unable to
complete it.
Tse-Tsung

This above is a segment from a report given during the 106th Conference on July 31st of
1955. The preface and meaning behind this conference was to bring to attention the possibilities
and shortcomings of undergoing such a strenuous task. This shows or puts an importance on the
success of large scale mechanized farming in future plans and projects across China. The one
mistake that ultimately set up and led toward poor yields of grain leaving many both hungry and
without food was how specifically they produced grain. In addition to that the amount of grain
that was planted needed a large workforce to tend and harvest such a huge amount. Many report
of crops dying and being unharvested due to lack of main power was also a huge factor to why
many people starved. Mao had many options/ reports to choose from about how to tackle such a
task. Many of them, predicted that in order for this to happen they would first need to be a halt in
both industrial production and a smoother more gradual transition into this communist way. The
fact that information such as this was out there way before it had even gotten to the dire levels
shows how Mao was very ardent in not only his beliefs but his words and how his words were
not only truthful but never wrong or slow.
The next part in this vision of moving toward this communist China Mao had set forth a
group of policies to form what would later be known as People's communes. By having these
communes it would solve many of the outstanding problems that the communist administration
faced with how to govern and monitor the working class population. From the period of 1949 to
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the late 1950s the communes started out small original anywhere from 5-20 families eventually
and gradually moving to anywhere from 200-300 families. These greater populations were
encouraged and eventually achieved because of their ease to maintain. Another major factor of
this was that with the greater population of people you can have the commune itself have
different uses. These work teams ranged from agriculture, industry, other economic functions
and many other positions within the communist system. Another important thing about this is
that whatever the role you had within the worker’s unit is that you would hold this position for
life. At first glance a system like this may seem fruitless but when you look at the surface
problems about things that needed to be fixed it had seemed to cover all bases.
This economic campaign was an introduction to the people of China about what toe
communist way of life was like. This way of life includes knowledge of mass agricultural
collectivization, backyard furnaces/collective production and communal living. something that
had not previously been widespread in around the world let alone in China. But even before any
of this could take place, the first thing China had or needed in order to essentially re-launch
China wascapital to support industrial development.
Now that we have laid out both the outline and the transition to this communist system
we can go in depth about specific things that these people communes jobs were during the Great
Leap Forward. Two important things that truly defined the mindset of the Great Leap Forward is
backyard furnaces and communal kitchens. With general basis of the communist breakdown and
the structure of the Great Leap Forward, we can now talk about how each of these specific
process failed when placed into implementation. There is a trend within these failures that are
neglected in order to protect these original Maoist ideals. So much to the fact that we all know it
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resulted in the deaths of 30 million Chinese people. These issues wouldn't even be addressed
until the pinnacle Lushan Conference.
First and more important was the problem with the backyard furnaces was fuel was
important to turn iron into steel. This program really took off during 1958 when these massive
furnaces started being set up within these communes. An important thing to note about this steel
production and process was that workers running these steel furnaces had little to no knowledge
about how to do their jobs. Because of this one of the first jobs put into place was to compile all
metal in order to make steel. The downside to this was because the families in communes
originally didn't have many metal items; most of the items that were melted down were of
extremely poor quality metal. Things like pots, bikes, old stoves and many other miscellaneous
things were melted down in order to try and forge steel.
The net result of this was a lot of materials and extreme amount of effort for what should
have produced a lot more steel. Instead they were left with lots of undefined iron known as pig
iron which needed to be re-smelted and refined to even become usable.In addition to the wasted
effort of scrapping old metal, the amount of fuel that was put into these furnaces to make steel
was pretty steep. Whole acres of forests were cut just to support the need for these furnaces as
well as anything made of wood that workers could find which often or not was scrap, parts of
houses and antiques. Similar to that of how they found the metal it was recorded that these
workers used whatever they could to keep the furnaces burning. The reasoning behind this
wasn’t because the science or math behind the actual production of steel, it was the fact that Mao
had believed that he himself and the workers were capable of finding and meeting these goals.
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From this point onward Mao and his rules and ideologies had set forth what would be a
slow and deadly disaster. At an initial high economic cost, it was very hard for the population of
China to maintain anything toward the latter half of the 1950s poor outcomes of the metal
produced from the backyard furnaces that needed even more time and effort to ever to become
usable. The poor yield of grain after the preliminary harvests, and inability to maintain the fields
ready planned due to soil erosion caused by Lysenko’s methods. On top of this they still had to
pay off the bought machinery from the Soviets with grain leaving none for millions of the people
in China. And finally, there was miscommunication between cadres and officials about how
much grain was being produced and how much each village actually had.To this day, even in
China the reasons why what had seemed to be an airtight plan failed was due to natural outside
8

factors. Certainly things such as flooding of the Hunan (Dikotter 178), in combination of other
natural disaster were not the cause, but they were outside factors that quickened the process. But
how and why was such a spiral possible under the eyes of so many people whos job it was to
solely prevent things like this from happening? To understand this we first need to go back and
understand the concept and political translation of how a system for communism works.

Toward the latter half of the 1950s there was a decision that had to be made by each of
the members of the CCP Politburo and more generally voices within the CCP. This decision
would determine which side they would choose. These two sides, were weather to agree with
Mao or do what was right for the people and citizens within China. For many this was a tough
choice These two sides would also be a defining factor of pro communist or signals of being a
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right thinker. This decision could also be a life or death choice later on. Many, despite what facts
were out there believed that Mao had the best intentions at heart and looked at a greater picture
of maintaining the view and ideals of the original communist fervor.
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Chapter III: The Lushan Conference
Now that we have spoken about the political side of how the bureaucracy works in how
policies are made and the public history of what happened during the Great Leap Forward in the
previous chapters we can use this knowledge to fully understand the events of the Lushan
Conference and how a letter from Peng Dehuai solidified Mao as being an unstoppable force in
the CCP.
Before the “Speech At The Lushan Conference” , the original speech that Mao had given
at the pivotal conference in LuShan, we need to analyze the personal letter Peng Dehuai had
written to Mao during the initial proceedings at Lushan. The purpose of this conference as to
address the shortcomings and failures of the Great Leap Forward and Five-year plans. Before the
conference outlining concerns that were not only brought up by him but other senior party
members such as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping. The letter itself is short and
concise when talking about specific short comings and policies during the Great Leap Forward.
The best way to analyze this letter I believe is to take the same approach we did when
understanding how policies were passed. This power versus policy categorization accurately
understands the breakdown and true intention behind this letter Peng had sent to Mao. The letter
as a whole in itself symbolized and embodies the validity that Peng (thought) he had with Mao
Zedong, this private letter as meant for Mao’s eyes and Mao’s eyes only. If Peng wanted this
letter to have been public he could have easily brought it to the attention to majority of the
Politburo and Standing Committee without the approval of Mao. Now when looking at the
contents of the letter before Peng Dehuai even begins to talk about the critiques of specific
aspects during the era of the Great Leap Forward, he prefaces the letter with an
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excerpt/description on what his position is by writing this specifically that he doesn't want this
letter to be perceived as personal attack:
But I am a simple man like Chang Fei [a hero in the 14th-century historical novel
Romance of the Three Kingdoms] Though I have only his roughness without his
cautiousness. For this reason, whether this letter is of reference value or not is for
9

you to decide. If what I say is wrong, please correct me.” (Dehuai 88)
Zhang Fei, in the novel “Romance of the Three Kingdoms” played a prominent role as a military
general under the rule of Liu Bei. This is important because Zhang Fei and Guan Yu were known
as very important military leaders under the reign of Liu Bei during this time. Even though they
weren't the leaders of the faction Zhang Fei and Guan Yu are very prominent figures within the
history of the romance of the Three kingdoms. In addition to the comparison between Peng and
Chang Fei, we also see him referring to Mao as Cao Cao a leader during the time of the Romance
of the Three Kingdoms. Cao Cao despite him being against all odds was an amazing military
strategist, leading not only his faction to victory but at one point in time Unifying all of northern
China under his rule. Cao Cao as a figure was known for not forgetting his roots of what is the
basics of creating a society. He was known as someone who was from the people that worked for
the people. So, similarly to the perception Mao has during the rise of the PRC and during the war
against the Nationalist you can understand why this comparison isn't just accurate but also a very
respected thing to say. Just this reference goes back to the overarching idea of that it was not in
any way shape or form an attack on the current leadership but specifically talking about general

9

“Speech at the conference of provincial and municipal.” The Foundations of the Chinese Planned

Economy, St. Martins Press, 1989, pp. 88–94.

Ali 27

ideas that had needed to be changed during the Great Leap Forward and how those things have
could of been executed better.

The crux of what I would like to discuss next is that of the specificities that Peng Dehuai
brought up within the same letter specifically it was the prominent features during that of the
Great Leap Forward. Specifically he brings up the main points or problems that Mao and the
party had run into during this era and that is agricultural collectivization, communal kitchens and
areas such as the prominent backyard furnaces and finally the yield and false recordings of the
Cadres of specific areas. As Peng Dehuai is talking about these sections in question he starts and
notes two things before he brings any criticism. The first is that the result of the Great Leap
Forward is not the fault of anyone specific, but the fault of the CCP failing the people of China
and lack of understanding of socialist ideals.The second being that the Great Leap Forward had
brought some success for not only China but China’s international standing. The three main
setbacks said before (Agricultural failure, importance on industrialization and mismanagement of
crop numbers); Peng carefully states and addresses the CCP as a whole and makes sure not to
implement anyone in specific. But the overall outcome of the Great Leap Forward still stands,
that a lot of the elements were very rushed, ultimately leaving the country in a worse state and
resulting in the deaths of 30 million people:
It now seems that some projects for capital construction in 1958 were too hasty or
excessive with the result that a portion of capital was tied up and essential projects
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were delayed...We had not understood this sufficiently, and when we understood
it it was too late.

10

Dehuai
Having to physically state this was necessary despite the risk it has, But what as
interesting was the way that this phrase and others were meticulously worded in order to cause
little to no harm. As someone who has been right when Mao was preaching about Anti-rightist
ideals this was a important to do because Peng was well aware of the consequences of outright
opposing Mao and his ideals. Responses such as this are stated throughout the letter after each of
the paragraphs never once was the word “I” or the name of another put under the guise of
causing such an atrocity to happen. It's a different approach that eases the reasoning of the letter
but also states it in the most respectful way. In some ways it is interesting reading and hearing a
letter like this from one elected official to another. On the surface we hear and read about the
strictness of the ranks of the CCP but rarely get to see the personal side of these leaders such as
Peng Dehuai and other vice premiers during this party. This also goes to show the type of
relationship these vice premiers had behind doors to Mao and how much they influenced and
helped Mao with many of the decisions. The next overarching point I would like to talk about in
the letter sent to Mao is the ending and the tone it set. After going over the specifics of what
needed and the negatives that happened during this during the time of the Great Leap Forward
the next issue at hand as to find a way to move forward from everything that happened:
I feel that it could be quite useful to make a systematic summing up of the
achievements and lessons gained in our work since the second half of last year so
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that comrades of the whole Party can be further educated. The aim is to
distinguish the right from the wrong and raise our understanding.

11

Dehuai

Now that we have gone through the general discussion in the letter, we can talk about
what I believe is the most important part which is the legitimacy of each of each of the
components presented to see if the arguments were valid that were being made in the letter.
Throughout the letter we see good mixed with the bad it seems almost of a list of a recap and
mutual understanding of how and what exactly happened during the previous years of the Great
Leap Forward. Starting off with industrial production, he talks about its general increase from
previous years, and that each year there is a gradual increase in both revenue and production.
Below is a quote about the specific outputs of grain and other production in China during this
time. You can see a pattern starting to unfold when looking at it and other examples:
Gross output industry and agriculture in 1958 rose by 48.4 per cent as compared
with 1957. Industry grew by 66.1 per cent and agriculture and subsidiary
production by 25 per cent (the increase in grain and cotton output being definitely
30 per cent). State financial receipts increased by 43.5 per cent. Such a rate of
growth has never been achieved in other parts of the world. Norms set for the
12

speed of socialist construction have been surpassed.”

Dehuai
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Despite this statement being true we see Peng doing something very interesting which is relevant
throughout the entire piece an in other examples. He groups the terrible, with the good to create a
statement or figure that is normal or mundane. As stated previously, agricultural yields did
increase from before the communist takeover in 1949 to that of the preliminary stages of the
Great Leap Forward the peak being 1955, after that we see a almost one quarter total loss of
13

grain yields form the years of 1957 to 1958 (Jowett 383). But when paired with the numbers
and yields of a less produced and easier growing crop we see that the overall statistics of
production were on a positive upward moving trend. But interestingly enough, after each of these
patterns a solution is offered. For the example a general statement of this would be:
It now seems that some projects for capital construction in 1958 were too hasty or
excessive… However these construction projects were after all needed for
national construction, and in the next year or to or even a little longer they will
14

gradually yield returns”

Dehuai
Again, the reassurance that despite setbacks and after inserting a seed or idea of change that
everything in the end will be alright. And it did play out that way but not under the ideas and
power of Mao it as others who had stepped up and decided to make change. One of the original
people Deng Xiaoping pushed for more of an economic reform versus that of ideological law.
But laws like this and being able to freely think about how to recover from such loss didn't
happen until the late 80’s when majority of the Mao feror had died down after his death in 1976.
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One of the only times I Peng really presses on what Mao’s decisions and ideals were are
when he talks about specific production and the honesty behind his ideals. As stated before in a
speech mentioned in the first chapter “On The Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture”,
Mao talks about how anything that is possible can be done under the ideals and guise of
Communism. Another very important part of this speech comes later on when he says:

As for the inspection of the progress of the co-operative movement, the Central
Committee and the provincial, autonomous region, municipal and prefectural
committees of the Party must take it firmly in hand and make sure that it is done
not once but several times every year. Whenever a problem crops up, tackle it
right away; don't let problems pile up and then try to settle them all at one go.
Make criticism in good time; don't get into the habit of criticizing only after the
event.
Tse-Tsung
What Mao says here is so ironic during this and countless other speeches he had made during
this time. That if a problem arises “tackle it right away,” a message that reassured the people and
workers during the time of the Great Leap Forward but slowly lost its validity especially in the
higher positions within the CCP as the disasters started to unfold. This quote also transitions very
well into the next major part and problem of the Great Leap Forward, that being false reports of
grain and product yield during this time. As stated by a high official of the CCP Politburo there
is a forward admittance to falcified production output. Similar to the previous example, the
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blame of this is somewhat obscured. How it is no ones direct fault because it was in good faith or
15

as he states in his letter “[c]aused not a few Comrades to become dizzy” (Dehuai 92) as we
know we know that this is yet again not fully the truth. Actual yield outcome as we know was
forged in order to make sure and confirm that the Mao certified Lysenko process was a success.
Later he then goes on to explain that the failed crop yield was solely based on poor weather
conditions during that time.

After analysing the whole letter I think this paints a pretty clear picture about not only the
motives but the intentions behind a message such as this. The way that Peng writes gives it the
feeling that it is specifically criticism toward the movement, and specific radical decisions made
by Mao that resulted in the failure of the Great Leap Forward and “indirectly” the deaths of 30
million citizens of China. The reason this letter from Peng seems so optimistic we can derive
from the end of his letter. It says:
To overcome them with throughoness, we still have to work hard for a time. Just
as the chairman has pointed out at this meeting: ‘The achievements are
tremendous, the problems are numerous, the experience is rich and the future is
bright’. We must take the initiative to unite the whole Party and work hard.”

16

Dehuai
Unlike many of the other people who came forward during the time of the Great Leap Forward
saying all of the bad things that would occur, many of them didn't go upon it the way Peng had.
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In addition to this he made sure that at the end of this letter that he didn’t undermine the
authority and power Mao had still within the party. By recognizing this, it implied that Peng
understood his position of being of lesser power than that of Mao and that the CCP was on a
position to turn around the setbacks they had during the Great Leap Forward. And we see this in
the last lines of this letter when he quotes Mao by saying that “the achievements are tremendous,
17

the problems are numerous, the experience is rich and the future is bright” (Dehuai 94)

Now that we have an understanding of Pengs letter and a background on the previous 10
years prior to the Lushan Conference we can analyze from a objective the speech Mao Zedong
gave in response to Peng Dehuai’s “Letter of Opinion”. The result of Mao’s letter would
ultimately lead to the purge of Peng and place other party members that supported a change
under fire. As stated in the original letter, it was not intended to criticize the shortcomings of the
Great Leap Forward; but simply a letter about how to move forward from the setbacks. After
reading this letter, Mao the next day had written a lengthy speech that he then gave in front of
everyone in attendance of the Lushan Conference. In addition to this when he looked at and
breakdown his speech part by part it paints a different picture than that of what Peng’s thoughts
were. This turned the Lushan Conference which was originally a time meant to discuss the
shortcoming and setbacks from the Great Leap forward into a resurgence of an anti-rightist witch
hunt.
Mao’s speech from a general sense directly addresses parts of the letter but does not
address problems brought up within the letter. Similar to Peng’s letter, and a common theme
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throughout most of Mao’s speeches, he uses metaphors and analogies to get a point across but to
also paint a picture of the situation and strain he is under. Throughout the piece we see a main
difference from Peng’s Letter and Mao’s Lushan letter and that is the tone when he talks about
himself, his comrades and the people. Peng uses phrases and words such as, The people, “the
government” and “us” being careful never to single out one person. We look at Mao’s speech, it
is riddled with phrases opposite to this. For example, “I would advise comrades”, “I ought not to
make excuses, but I shall too, because I am not the head of the Planning Commission.” and
“other people should also take some of the responsibility.” (Tse-Tsung) . His speech is littered
with making sure that there is a distinct line between his ideas and faults and those of others.
This, would eventually work out in his favor based on the premise and reasoning behind making
this distinction because the speech’s outlining ideals would be about a rising anti-rightist
sentiment.
If we now go into detail about the specific points he is making within the speech we can
closely find out if the reasoning behind the points he makes and see if he addresses any of the
core points that we have discussed or even points he brings up from the Peng letter. When we
read Mao’s speech more in depth we see that the premise of this writing is more catered toward
the specific people in charge of cadres and officials who were supposed to oversee many of these
programs:
It was mainly the cadres who had not understood that this kind of wealth was
[not] ill-gotten. They could not make the distinction between the two kinds. They
had not properly studied political economy. They had not clearly understood the
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laws of value, exchange of equal values, and remuneration according to work
done. In a few months they were convinced and stopped doing it.
Tse-Tsung

This emphasis on the fault of Cadres is persistent throughout this piece and is also something to
be noted. In the above quote we see that Mao is placing blame on the Cadres and who were
appoint to do as such. Throughout the rest of this piece we see Mao trying to paint a picture
about how regulations were clear, and assignments were clear, but when it came to the education
about how to get certain things done and the education of what communism was there as a
disconnect between that and of the cadres of China. He then continues to advocate and pressure
this idea of education that Peng, and even some historians understood to be a downfall but with a
twist. In the middle of his speech he gives an interesting example about how education or
understanding specific communist values isn't a reason to why specific tasks cannot be
completed. The analogy he uses two examples of historical figures, one is a general named Ts’ao
18

and the other was a Prime Minister called Ch’en Fa-chih, neither of these men had knowledge
of how to read or write but both were still able to do their job and more over still indulge in
written arts such as poetry:
If an illiterate can become a prime minister, why can’t our commune cadres and
peasants listen to some political economy? I think they can learn it. If it is
explained to them, they can learn some political economy even if they can’t read.
Explain it to them and they will understand it. In fact they can understand things
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better than intellectuals. I myself have not read the textbooks, and I have no right
to discuss them until I have. We must squeeze out some time; the whole Party
should run a study campaign.
Tse-Tsung
We see also in the above quote that Mao still was in this realization, especially in this
post-Hundred flowers speech that not only was there no reason why specific people couldn't
learn or understand the education and also the fact that anyone can become an intellectual. We
learned from the previous chapters that Mao’s original outreach program to encourage
intellectuals and critiques was changed into a purging of negative or non-constructive ideals. The
result of this was punishment or banishment of the people who stood up as we had discussed
earlier, in addition to this and the consequences Mao continues to go on to even taunt or push
thoses who have a problem with the methods and plans to step forward and say something:

During the first half of the month people had a lot of worries. Now these worries
have all come out into the open. If you have anything to say, say it and it will all
be written down in the minutes. Spoken evidence has to be written down. If you
have things to say, then say them. If you find faults in me, then you should correct
me. Don’t be afraid if your shoes pinch. I said at the Chengtu Conference that one
should not fear the guardroom. One should not even be afraid of execution or
expulsion from the Party. If a communist and senior cadre has so many inhibitions
it is because he is afraid of saying the wrong thing and being corrected.
Tse-Tsung
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The next important thing within this letter I say is when he directly addresses the letter Peng had
sent to him. Out of all of the things that Peng had spoken about within his letter the only time he
really addresses any of it is toward the end. Toward the end of this speech he talks mainly about
what he calls “his decision” to have such an emphasis on steel production. In this section he says
that it was his fault to overestimate the amount of work that could be produced at the time and
the means of making such goal possible, was impossible. Besides that, the remainder of the
questions posed by Peng were addressed as faults of others. Moreover at the end, similar to
Peng’s letter he talks about how others should come forward about the reasons or why specific
programs and systems failed during the First 5 Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward.
In the end of this whole process of first analyzing what was being said and addressed
publicly versus what was actually known about the rise and choices being made in the
government during this time is black and white. Shortly, after this Lushan Conference Peng
Dehuai was removed from power along with other people that had supported him or criticized
Mao and his policies. It was also after this conference that Mao had decided to take a back seat
in-terms of policy making and leading the CCP and instead decided to let other party members
lead. But the example of how much Power Mao had within the CCP Politburo was already
realized.
Even well after both the conference and his step down from power the lingering influence
he had on the people in China was apparent. He had successfully got rid of all those who had
opposed communism, which in turn was getting rid of everyone that had opposed him. The
following event after this era was not any better, Mao still believed after multiple Anti-rightist
movements that there was still a threat to his legacy and what he had created; this Cultural
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Revolution would bring more of the same disastrous results silumular that that of the beginning
of the Hundred Flowers Campaign.
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Conclusion
In conclusion we see that on a historical level they were multiple faults during this ten
year period from the beginning of the PRC to the Lushan Conference. Throughout this time there
was multiple realizations by a number of people during this time warning not only Mao but other
strong voices within the CCP about the risks and predictions brought upon by these economic
and social changes. I think the only way to fully understand the reasoning behind everyone's
allegiance and dedication to Mao’s rule is the previous history and hardships they had gone
through. Post-war during the founding of the PRC things were rushed due to the fact that things
had to be done or there was a threat they would lose everything they had fought for. So, the
members of the CCP gave Mao free reign because he was the only constant factor between the
CCP and the people. And it was from there on that he solidified himself as the one and only face
of China. When people started to realize that he might not of been the best choice he perceived
this as a threat to not only him but all of the effort he had put into getting China where it is today.

We see this within the analysis of the letters by both Mao and Peng. The intentions of
Peng were not malicious in anyway; both him and other political leaders and intellectuals had the
same vision; but realized that the current method of getting there was too costly. On the other
hand Mao had more than just economic plans on the line but an ideology that he himself created
and did everything to protect. The ideology that if attacked then the only possible outcome was
to remove things or people that are in the way of progress. Because of the amount of power they
allowed Mao to accumulate over this 10 year period it turned this supposed communist
government into a Totalitaristic system ruled solely by Mao Zedong
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